Abstract
Professional baseball has experienced numerous work-stoppages over the last 30 years, including three which resulted in the cancellation of games. Existing estimates of the demand for attendance at Major League Baseball games has found that only those events which caused the loss of games influenced attendance. This paper revisits the issue of whether strikes affect attendance and finds that even those lockouts and strikes that do not cause games to be canceled are associated with significantly lower attendance.
Moreover, despite dramatic differences in the severity of the three strikes that canceled games, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects are the same. Finally, the evidence here suggests that attendance is adversely affected by events leading up to negotiation of a new Basic Agreement between the players and the owners.
Professional baseball narrowly averted a work stoppage during the 2002 season. That a strike was avoided is surprising if one realizes that since the players organized for the purposes of collective bargaining in the mid-1960's, every time an agreement between the players and owners expired some sort of work stoppage followed. The 1994-95 workstoppage is undoubtedly the most severe sports labor disruption to date. Not only did it result in the cancellation of the last third of the 1994 season, including the playoffs and the World Series, but it spilled over into the 1995 season. Yet it still took more than 6 months after the expiration of the agreement signed to end that strike, and a date being set for another strike to begin, before the Major League Baseball Players Association and Major League Baseball settled on a new contract.
Over time the issues between the players and the owners have varied, though the basic problem has been the same. Owners want players to have less freedom to sell their services on the open market, players want more freedom to do so. Consequently, battles have been fought, and largely won by the players, for the right to salary arbitration, and for free agency. The owners have tried to soften the blow of salary arbitration and free agency. They have sought to lengthen the number of years of service a player must have before being eligible for arbitration or free agency, they have tried to impose high costs on teams that sign top-line free agents, and they have sought salary caps. 1 This paper is not about the labor-management issues per se, but is about the effects of these disputes on attendance at major league ball-parks. Owners and players alike need to understand the consequences of their actions, particularly since it is ultimately the fans that pay the bills. In this paper we estimate the relationship between average attendance per major league baseball game for each team over the period 1969 to 1996. In other words, we have a cross section-time series data set in which the dependent variable is the average attendance at major league baseball games of a given team in a specific year. After controlling for ticket prices, incomes, populations, quality of play and players, and lagged attendance per game, we estimate the effect on attendance per game of strikes or lockouts. Existing work on the effects of labor unrest in baseball would suggest that the lack of a strike in 2002 meant there was no impact of the discord on attendance. This paper raises doubts about that conclusion.
It seems obvious that all strikes and lockouts are not the same. For example, the strikes that have occurred in baseball since 1969 have varied in duration and in severity.
The first instance of a baseball strike was in 1969. In this case, spring training was delayed but the regular season and post-season went off as planned. The strikes of 1972, 1981, and 1994-95 are the only incidents that resulted in lost games. In 1972, the players struck for 13 days, and 86 games were lost. The strike of 1981 lasted for 50 days and about 700 games were lost. The strike of 1994 put an end to the season, resulted in the cancellation of the playoffs and the World Series, and delayed the start of the 1995 season. In all, the strike lasted 232 days and resulted in 920 games being canceled.
Sprinkled throughout the period are strikes or lockouts in 1973, 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1990 which lasted for various lengths of time ranging from 2 days, in 1985, to 32 days, in 1990, but which did not cause any games to be canceled. We find that these strikes and lockouts did not all result in the same repercussions at the gate. On the other hand, we find some surprising similarities across the different strikes. Attendance appears to follow the same time path from one strike to the next, for example, and for the 1972 and 1981 strikes the affects are not statistically different from one another. These strikes are found to have generated equal reductions in per game attendance of about 10 to 12% while the 1994-95 strike caused about a 24% reduction.
We also find that despite having no effect on the number of games played, the events in 1973, 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1990 generate statistically significant reductions in season attendance of between 3 to 7%. In those instances, players were "locked out" or walked out on strike. The question this raises is whether labor management discord that does not include a work-stoppage, like the 2002 situation, results in lost attendance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the literature on demand for attendance. This paper fits squarely into that literature, but while our emphasis is not on income and price elasticities of demand for attendance, we do produce evidence on the size of those important concepts. The best measure of price is a matter of some debate in the literature, and one of the technical issues addressed here.
We follow the literature review with a discussion of the data set and the estimation scheme. The results are reported and discussed in the fourth section and we conclude with a brief summary.
Attendance literature
Because attendance is a major source of revenue for all sports teams, modeling the demand for attendance is an integral part of sports economics. The two earliest attendance models were done in the 1970s (Demmert 1973; . Neither examined the effects of strikes, but each found the effects of ticket prices to be problematic. The appropriate measure of ticket prices is an issue in the literature to which this paper will make a contribution.
The attendance models published since Demmert's and Noll's seminal papers have generally included data about population characteristics, stadium characteristics, and the availability of substitutes as well as price and team quality data.
3 Some have focused on special issues. 4 One such special issue is the topic of this paper, the effects of baseball strikes and lockouts on attendance. Coffin (1996) Using a time-series of aggregate attendance for MLB, Schmidt and Berri (2002; 2004) test for the impact of the strikes in 1981 and 1994-95. Their base model does not include any behavioral variables to explain attendance demand, but simply focuses on the stability of the time-series. They find, not unexpectedly, that attendance was harmed by 3 Examples of such studies include the Demmert (1973), and studies mentioned above as well as work by Siegfried and Eisenberg (1980) , Coffin (1996) and Bruggink and Eaton (1996) . 4 For example, Kahane and Shmanske (1997) examine the effects of roster instability on attendance. Schmidt and Berri (2001) consider the effects of competitive balance, Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert (1992) look for the effect of uncertainty of outcome, and Domazlicky and Kerr (1990) examine the role of the designated hitter rule.
the strikes in 1981 and 1994-95, but they also find that attendance recovers from the effects of those strikes in the next year. find that other episodes of labormanagement unrest have no effect on attendance, either in the season in which they occur or in any other seasons. Indeed, the only other non-random influences on attendance are the post-World War II shock that makes attendance 20% larger than it had been previously and the National League expansion in 1993.
The existing evidence on the effects of strikes in professional baseball is, apparently, clear. Both Coffin (1996) and Schmidt and Berri (2002; 2004) found any impact of the strikes or lockouts that cancelled no games.
Discussion of Data
The attendance data used in this paper follows each franchise in the United States from 1969 until 1996, including franc hises that move and franchises that come into existence through expansion. This means that two franchises, the Montreal Expos and the Toronto Blue Jays, are omitted from the analysis. The attendance variable is the attendance per game for an individual team averaged over the entire season. Various approaches have been taken in the literature, some researchers using per game or annual attendance by team (Demmert 1973; Coffin 1996; Kahane 1997) , some using game by game attendance across a season (Bruggink and Eaton1996) , and still others using leaguewide annual attendance per team (Schmidt and Berri 2002; 2004 This is an interesting possibility and is more fully addressed below. 6 Moreover, pricing behavior seems quite different after 1996. For example, between 1992 and 1993 only 4 teams raised prices by more than $1 on average, between 1993 and 1994, 12 teams did so with three of them raising average price by more than $2. Two of the teams that raised price by more than $2 opened new stadiums that year. Between 1996 and 1997, 12 teams raised prices more than $1, and five of them raised price by more than $2. Only one franchise opened a new stadium that year. Finally, between 1997 and 1998, 16 teams raised price more than $1, 11 of those by more than $2, 6 of those by more than $3, and 3 by more than $4.
the period 1990 through 1996. The latter method can be considered the "actualized" average ticket price. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages and their proponents and detractors. The bottom line of this debate is that either the ticket price is measured with error or it is endogenous. In either case, an appropriate estimation technique to control for the data problem is instrumental variables regression.
Consequently, we use IV techniques, and this enables us to assess which type price variable works best in the estimation of attendance.
The raw price variable for the period 1990 to 1996 was constructed using the gate receipt data from Rodney Fort's MLB Business Pages website and the total attendance for each team for each year. 7 The nominal average ticket prices are deflated by the Consumer Price Index using a base year of 1983. This variable is called GATE. also common in the literature on attendance demand to include the percent of the population that is black (PCTBLACK) and one paper (1996) also uses the percent of population that is Hispanic (PCTHISP). We use each of these variables as a regressor.
Variables that account for the history of the franchise are also commonly used in attendance demand models. We use the age of each franchise (TEAM AGE) to capture the effect of having a long history in a city as well as the novelty effect of having an expansion team in a city. Additionally, we control for the effects of the quality of the stadium using its age (STAD AGE) and a dummy variable indicating if that stadium is in its last year of operation (LAST YEAR). We hypothesize that younger parks will have greater attendance, all other things constant, than older parks, so we expect the stadium age variable will have a negative coefficient. 11 However, in the last year a stadium is in operation, we expect attendance to be greater, all other things equal, as fans express nostalgia for the old park. One important factor that must be held constant to find the effects hypothesized for stadium age and last year of operation is the capacity of the stadium. Consequently, stadium capacity is included as an explanatory variable (CAPACITY).
Models of attendance demand also control for the quality of the team, both via its success on the field and through the abilities of its players. We control for the success of novelty effect lasts?) and, consequently, less intuitive. A case-in-point is Coffin's (1996) attendance study which uses a variable that begins at 4 in the first year a stadium is open and declines by one each year until it reaches zero in the fifth and every subsequent year after the facility opens. His justification is that "[f]ollowing some experimentation … [this method] led to the best results" (p.38) and the approach clearly addresses the issue of "novelty" effects. However, the age of stadiums affects attendance in more ways than simply as a novelty. Aging stadiums are less comfortable and offer fewer amenities than newer facilities. The experience of the trip to the ballpark is less satisfying in a decrepit facility than in a modern one, even after novelty effects are controlled for, so a variable like Coffin's misses important determinants of attendance.
If two baseball teams have the same record, same size market, etc., but one has a superstar and the other does not, the team with the star would be expected to draw more fans. We capture the prowess of the players on a roster with two variables, all-time AllStars (AAS) and BLACK INK. All-time All Stars is developed from the website Baseball-Reference.com which counts the number of players that were ever on an AllStar roster that are on a team in a given season. "Black ink" is a term used by BaseballReference.com that means a player led the league in a category. 13 The black ink variable used here includes more than just league leaders. It is calculated as the number of times, in a given season, players from each team show up in the top ten of their league's leader boards for the following statistics: batting average, home runs, runs batted in, wins, earned run average, and pitcher strikeouts. Admittedly, these variables are not perfect measures of the ability of star players to attract fans, but they are objective and should be a good proxy of the overall star power on a team.
The focus of this paper is on the effects of strikes and lock outs in Major League
Baseball on attendance. These events are accounted for in three ways. First, strikes and lockouts that result in no games being cancelled are lumped together in one variable.
Three of these occurred during spring training (1973, 1976, and 1990) , and the 1980 event occurred in May, leaving the vast majority of the season to play after the strike.
Consequently, if these events had any effect on attendance per game it is most likely that affect is spread throughout the entire season. The one exception is the strike of 1985 that took place in August. Because this strike occurred during the period of relatively high demand, its effects on attendance may differ from those of the other events that did not 13 Baseball encyclopedias and baseball cards tend to highlight league-leading statistics with boldfacehence the term "black ink." 1972 , 1981 , and 1995 STRIKE2 equals 1 in 1973 STRIKE2 equals 1 in , 1982 STRIKE2 equals 1 in , and 1996 STRIKE3 equals 1 in 1974 and 1983; and STRIKE4 equals 1 in 1975 and 1984. 14 STRIKE3 and STRIKE4 are not equal to one in 1997 and 1998, respectively, because those years are not in the data for the reasons outlined above. 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 , which enables one to assess if the effect on attendance is the same in corresponding years across both strikes, the 15 The result was to lose 52 days from the 1994 season and 25 days from the 1995 season. Zimbalist (2003) says that 938 games were lost from the regular season schedule. The 920 lost games comes from (2002) . 16 An alternative approach is to use the number of games lost, per team, as a regressor. In most years this variable is zero, but in strike years it is the number of games lost divided by the number of teams. This approach produces very similar results as the approach reported on below. Moreover, if the STRIKE1, STRIKE2, STRIKE3, and STRIKE4 variables are regressors along with this games lost variable, the former carry coefficients and t-statistics like those reported below, while the latter is not remotely statistically significant. These results are available upon request. 17 We also included a dummy variable for 1985. That variable was rarely significant and uniformly positive, suggesting that the 1985 strike in early August was not different from the other strikes and lockouts from which no games were lost.
variables may beha ve very much like a non-linear time trend. To control for this, the ana lysis includes the lagged value of the per game attendance as an explanatory variable (LAGATT_G). Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable raises the question of stability of the model. Unit root tests, whether the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is equal to 1, soundly reject the null hypothesis. Schmidt and Berri (2002) reach a similar conclusion on annual league-wide attendance data.
One l ast set of variables used in the analysis must be discussed. The measurement error and endogeneity issues with the ticket price variables suggest use of an instrumental variables technique. We use city specific dummy variables in a first stage regression, along with the stadium, player and demographic variables described above, to predict the ticket prices. One might contend that the city specific effects belong in the attendance equation directly. However, results for the price variable are more stable and more frequently consistent with economic theory when the city specific effects are in the first stage equation than when they are in the attendance demand equation. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables except the city specific dummies for all of Major League Baseball and for each league individually for the period 1969 through 1996. GATE, SEAT, and NOLL-PAPPAS have fewer observations than the other variables because they are not available for the full sample period as was discussed above.
Results
In this section we discuss the results of estimating the demand for attendance at Major
League Baseball games and the effects that labor-management unrest have on that attendance. Table 2 reports results of instrumental variables estimation of the attendance demand equations for each of the three price variables when the four STRIKE variables are regressors. The evidence of Table 2 indicates that attendance demand is price inelastic, that attendance demand is persistent from year to year, and that the greater the on-field success the greater the success at the ticket window. Stadium and franchise age, player quality, and the city's population base are also generally significant determinants of attendance. Average income, racial composition of the city, stadium capacity, and the league the team plays in, are generally not statistically significant determinants of attendance.
Turning to the effects of strikes and lockouts, t he LOCKOUT variable is statistically significant i n the LN GATE and LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations. This suggests that attendance is down by about 3 to 7 percent even after minor labormanagement dustups. Recall that most of these events occurred during spring training and none caused cancellation of any regular season or post-season games. Neither Schmidt and Berri (2002; 2004) nor Coffin (1996) find these events to be statistically significant. The estimates in the LN NOLL-PAPPAS equation seem the most reliable of the three. The data covers three extra seasons relative to the LN SEAT model, and it covers several events whereas the time period for the LN GATE model only had one lockout.
STRIKE1 is significantly negative in all three equations. The coefficients indicate that in the year a strike occurs attendance per game is lowered by about 12 to 13 percent relative to the average attendance level through to 1988. Using the LN SEAT and LN NOLL-PAPPAS models, attendance rebounds the year following the strike to about 6% above trend. Using the LN GATE price variable, the only price variable that covers the 1994-95 strike, the evidence is that attendance fell by 24% in 1995 as a result of the strike of 1994-95. Fan ire over the cancellation of the previous season's playoffs and the World Series is clearly evident in this drop off which is nearly double that for either of the earlier strikes. Attendance appears to bounce back to the trend level in 1996, similar to the findings of Schmidt and Berri (2002; 2004) , as the variable for the year after the strike is not statistically different from zero. Interestingly, attendance dips below trend three years after the strike in both the LN SEAT and LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations, perhaps signaling some residual resentment on the part of fans about the previous strike as negotiations over the next collective bargaining agreement begin.
Table s 3 and 4 present results of estimating the models when each year of a strike is identified separately, followed by each of the next three years. This approach allows each strike to be distinct compared to the approach reported in Table 2 where each strike had the same effect. The disadvantage of this approach is that the variables indicating the strikes act very nearly like a set of year fixed effects so that interpretation of the effects as being the result of the strikes is problematic. Consequently, the models are estimated two ways, once with a nonlinear trend as an explanatory variable (Table 3 ) and once with it as an instrument but not in the demand equation (Table 4 ). The results are quite similar between the LN SEAT and the LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations both with and without the trend variable. Two differences of note are that the inclusion of the nonlinear time trend as a regressor results in 1) smaller price elasticity estimates which are no longer statistically different from zero and 2) the income elasticity has the wrong sign and is not statistically significant. When the nonlinear trend is omitted from the equation, the price elasticity estimates are statistically significant and about the same size as those reported in Table 2 . The income elasticity in the LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations is statistically significant and about the same size as in Table 3 .
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Consider 1972 and 1981, the years the strikes occurred. Attendance is lower by a statistically significant amount estimated between 10 and 12% for 1972 and between 11
and 16% for 1981. By contrast, Schmidt and Berri [Schmidt, 2002 #43; Schmidt, 2004 #55] find no effect of the 1972 strike. Moreover, tests of the equality of the coefficients for 1972 and 1981 can not reject the null hypothesis despite the rather dramatic difference in the severity of the two strikes and the differences in when the two strikes occurred during the season. Players Association. The result also means that modeling the strikes with a common STRIKE1, STRIKE2, etc., as in Table 2 , is supported by the data.
The final set of results introduces forecasts of ticket prices as an explanatory variable. In this way, the data from 1969 through 1996 can all be u sed in the 18 No estimates are available for the LN GATE model as the price series does not go back before 1990. 19 A table of the test statistics is available upon request.
regressions. 20 Table 5 presents these results whe n the trend is included, Table 6 when it is not. Note that the price and income variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant in Table 6 , and that price has the right sign and is significant in Table 5 . 21 Coefficients on other variables are generally consistent with the IV results in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The one clear exception to this generalization is the consistently positive and significant effects of BLACK INK. These suggest that an additional league leading player raises attendance per game by between 0.5 and 0.7%.
As for the effects of the strikes, the evidence i s that the strike and lockout variables are not all zero. F-tests easily reject the null hypothesis for the regressions that include strike effects in either Table 5 or Table 6 . Of more interest is the question of whether the effects in the year of the strike are the same across all three strikes, as is imposed by the use of the STRIKE variables. For the model that includes the time trend, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the same for the 1972 and 1981 strikes, as before. However, one can reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the same in 1972, 1981, and 1995. The F-statistic is 3.28, with 2 and 695 degrees of freedom. In other words, the 1994-95 strike had a statistically different impact on attendance once the strike was resolved than had the earlier strikes, at least if the attendance equation includes the nonlinear time trend. 20 The equation for predicting the average ticket price has as the dependent variable the PAPPAS variable, in log form, and uses all the explanatory variables in the model and city specific dummy variables. The adjusted R 2 for the regression is 0.66. There are 39 variables, including the city specific effects, and 19 of them are individually significant at the 10% level or better, 11 of those are city dummies. The others include log of population, percent black, log of stadium age, All Time All-Stars, Black ink, log of the team age, winning percentage, and a nonlinear time trend. Results are available upon request. 21 The t-statistics in the table are conditional as the standard errors on which they are based have not been corrected for the use of the fitted price variable as a regressor. The results are, however, generally similar to those of the instrumental variables estimates reported in the earlier tables. Moreover, the corrected standard errors are only about 2.5% larger than the conditional ones, so the effects on t-statistics and pvalues are small.
When the model does not include the trend variable, the results are different.
Specifically, without the trend as a regressor, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 1972, 1981, and 1994-95 strikes had the same effect on attendance. The F-statistic for this test is 2.16, with 2 and 696 degrees of freedom.
The years after the strikes are not statistically different from one another. In other words, the hypothesis that 1973, 1982, and 1996 are alike cannot be rejected in either model. It is also not possible to reject the null hypotheses that 1974 and 1983, the second year after the first two strikes, are alike, nor can one reject the hypothesis that 1975 and 1984 have the same effects. In other words, the effects of the two earlier strikes have the same time path until the next Basic Agreement, and the 1994-95 path seems the same though it is not possible to follow that path all the way to the next round of bargaining.
Conclusion
Major league baseball avoided a work stoppage during the 2002 season. During the negotiations, a commonly heard statement was that baseball had never recovered from the strike of 1994. Schmidt and Berri (2002) published evidence from time-series analysis suggesting that the effects of strikes on attendance have historically disappeared in the season following the strike. They suggested the same was true for the 1994 strike, especially if one looked over the period 1993 to 1996. This, they say, is appropriate because 1993 and 1994 prior to the strike both exhibited very high attendance. The results here bear out the point that strike effects do not carry over into subsequent years.
The strike effects here are, on the other hand, substantially smaller than those reported by Schmidt and Berri, who find that attendance is lower by 30% in 1981, and by 35% in 1994 . Moreover, the evidence here suggests that the earlier strikes, those in 1972 and 1981, had the same consequences for attendance despite substantially different durations and games canceled. Additionally, the results of this paper indicate that the relatively minor labor management squabbles that we have labeled LOCKOUT had real effects on attendance in the years they occurred. This is a new finding of this research.
There is also support in the evidence here for several other hypotheses about attendance at professional sporting events. For example, the results here strongly support the link between success on the field and at the gate. Teams with better winning percentages this year and that made the playoffs last year attract more fans per game than unsuccessful teams. We also find that teams playing in older stadiums attract fewer fans.
The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in stadium age results in between a .25 and a .5% reduction in per game attendance. Additionally, the results suggest that teams that have been in existence longer do better at the gate. There is mixed evidence on the effects of high quality players and on nostalgic effects in the last year of use of an existing stadium.
Demand for baseball attendance is found to be quite price inelastic and it does not matter whether price is measured using the seat price or the average gate approach so long as the estimation accounts for the likely endogeneity and measurement errors in the price series. Finding demand to be price inelastic is a puzzle. Most economists would agree that Major League Baseball has a substantial degree of market power. That market power, it is generally asserted, would result in monopoly pricing, that is, setting price to 
